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Can an Employer Reject
an Applicant Because the Workplace
Would Threaten His Health?
by Ralph C. Anzivino
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 274-278. © 2002 American Bar Association.

Ralph C. Anzivino is a professor
of law at Marquette University
Law School in Milwaukee, Wis.,
Rcanzivino@aol.com
or (414) 288-7094.

Editor's Note: The respondent's
brief in this case was not available
by PREVIEWs deadline.
ISSUE
Does the Americans with
Disabilities Act permit an employer
to refuse employment to a person
who it determines, on the basis of
the reasonable, individualized, and
objective conclusions of physicians,
would face a substantial risk of
significant harm or death in carrying out the essential functions of
the job?
FACTS
Mario Echazabal worked at
Chevron's El Segundo, Calif., refinery from 1972 to 1975 and 1979 to
1996. He was employed by independent contractors throughout that
time. His most recent employer was
Irwin Industries Inc. As an Irwin
employee, he worked throughout
the refinery as a laborer, helper, and
pipe fitter.
In 1992, Echazabal applied to work
directly for Chevron in the coker

unit and was offered the job contingent on a satisfactory medical examination. Chevron's regional physician, Dr. Philip Baily, conducted
that examination.
After a blood test showed that
Echazabal had significantly elevated
liver enzymes, Baily concluded that
Echazabal had an uncorrectable
liver abnormality and should avoid
exposure to toxic chemicals that
would exacerbate his liver problems.
In 1993, Baily's successor, Dr.
Kenneth McGill, agreed with that
assessment.
On that basis, Chevron rescinded its
offer of employment to Echazabal,
who continued to work at the refinery for Irwin. Chevron's doctors
advised Echazabal to follow up with
his own physicians, who subsequently confirmed that Echazabal
had "abnormal liver function."
Echazabal's doctor diagnosed him
with chronic active Hepatitis C and
treated his condition with the drug
Interferon.
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Chronic active Hepatitis C is a progressive disorder that can lead to
cirrhosis, liver failure, and death.
In late 1995, Echazabal again
applied to Chevron for a position as
plant helper in the coker unit.
Chevron's official job description
outlined the duties and physical
demands of that job, including the
requirement that the applicant be
able to work in an environment
containing hydrocarbons, solvents,
and other chemicals. Chevron again
offered Echazabal the job contingent upon his passing a medical
examination.
In conducting the examination,
McGill reviewed the results of the
eight blood tests performed on
Echazabal. All the tests showed that
Echazabal had significantly elevated
levels of multiple liver enzymes.
McGill concluded from those
tests and the prior diagnosis of
chronic active Hepatitis C that
Echazabal's liver had already suffered significant damage, resulting
in a greatly decreased capacity to
process toxins.

the risk of serious injury or death,
McGill said.
Echazabal's personal physician, Dr.
Zelman Weingarten, wrote Chevron
on Jan. 10, 1996, that Echazabal's
chronic active Hepatitis C had been
treated for extended periods with
Interferon without remedying the
problem, but that Echazabal was
not contagious and could return to
his usual duties at work. Because
the letter did not address the advisability of Echazabal's being exposed
to liver-toxic chemicals, McGill
called Weingarten. Weingarten told
McGill that Echazabal should not be
exposed to hepatotoxins and later
confirmed this opinion in writing.
Chevron's medical director, Dr. T.L.
Bridge, agreed with McGill's assessment that Echazabal could not safely work in the plant helper position.
McGill then informed Chevron's
human-resource manager, William
Saner, that, if Echazabal were hired,
his work should be limited so that
he not be exposed to solvents or
other liver-toxic chemicals. Saner
determined that such exposure is a
necessary and inseparable part of
the plant helper position and
accordingly withdrew the conditional job offer to Echazabal.

In the doctor's opinion, continued
exposure to liver toxins would seriously degrade Echazabal's liver
function. McGill understood from
Chevron's job description and his
own knowledge of the coker unit
that Echazabal would be exposed to
hepatotoxic chemicals and solvents
as a plant helper.

Subsequently, Chevron sent a letter
to Irwin asking that Irwin remove
Echazabal from the refinery or place
him in a position that eliminates his
exposure to solvents or chemicals.

The doctor concluded that even
small exposure to those substances
over a long period could pose a
health hazard to Echazabal. A single
event of large exposure - such as a
ruptured pipe, a relief valve popping, a fire or an explosion - could
by itself cause death. Furthermore,
Echazabal's impaired liver would be
less able to detoxify exposure to
chemicals that are not specifically
liver toxic, which would also carry

Irwin consulted Dr. Charles Tang.
After reviewing Echazabal's test
results, Tang said Echazabal's
markedly elevated liver enzymes
showed that chronic destruction of
his liver was occurring and that
there was a high probability that his
illness would be severely worsened
by exposure to even trace amounts
of hepatotoxins. After exposure,
Tang explained, some people have
died of massive hepatic failure in a

few hours. Accordingly, Tang concluded that Echazabal should not be
in the refinery if he could be
exposed to hepatotoxins. Irwin then
laid off Echazabal.
Echazabal sued Chevron in state
court, alleging that the company's
withdrawal of its 1995 employment
offer violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation
Act, and California's Fair
Employment and Housing Act. He
also alleged that Chevron intentionally interfered with his contractual
relations with Irwin. Echazabal
sought punitive as well as actual
damages for each claim.
After Chevron removed the action
to federal court, the district court
granted summary judgment to the
company on all of Echazabal's
claims. For purposes of the summary judgment motion, Chevron did
not dispute that Echazabal had a
"disability" within the meaning of
the ADA.
The district court held that under
the ADA an employer may refuse to
hire a person for a job that would
pose a direct threat to his or her
health. The court concluded that
Chevron's employment decision
rested on a reasonable medical judgment that Echazabal's employment
as a plant helper would pose a serious risk to him. The district court
denied summary judgment to Irwin
on Echazabal's similar discrimination claims but certified its rulings
in favor of Chevron for immediate
appeal.
On appeal, a divided panel of the
Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. The court held that an
employer's "direct threat" defense
under the ADA does not apply when
a job applicant's condition, such as
Echazabal's liver disease, poses a
threat to his or her own health or
(Continued on Page 276)

American Bar Association

275

safety. The law, however, does allow
employers to reject job applicants
whose condition would present a
direct threat to the welfare of others, the court said. Echazabal v.
Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063
(9th Cir. 2000).
The majority also rejected
Chevron's argument that Echazabal
was not "qualified" to perform the
"essential functions" of the plant
helper job because of the risks the
job posed to him.
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's holding, the Eleventh U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals has concluded that the
ADA's direct-threat defense does
apply to the disabled individual
himself. Moses v. American Non
Wovens, Inc. 97 F.3d 446 (11th Cir.
1996).
Chevron then petitioned for a writ
of certiorari, which the Supreme
Court granted.
CASE ANALYSIS
Title I of the ADA prohibits an
employer from discriminating
against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of
such individual. A "qualified individual with a disability" is a person
with a disability "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of
the employment position that such
individual holds or desires." In
determining what functions of a job
are essential, the ADA provides that
consideration shall be given to the
employer's judgment. The employer's preparation of a written description of the job shall be considered
evidence of the essential functions
of the job.
Discrimination prohibited by the
ADA includes using qualification
standards that screen out or tend to
screen out people with disabilities,
unless the standard is shown to be

job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business
necessity. Accordingly, the act specifies that it is a defense to a charge
of discrimination that qualification
standards that screen out people"
with disabilities are job related and
consistent with business necessity.
Further, the ADA specifies that an
employer may impose as a "qualification standard" a requirement that
an individual not pose a "direct
threat" to the health or safety of
other individuals in the workplace.
The ADA makes no mention, however, of the health or safety of the
applicants themselves.
Shortly after the ADA was adopted,
the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission promulgated regulations regarding when a
qualification standard is job related
and consistent with business necessity. The EEOC stated that the term
"qualification standard" may
include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat
to others in the workplace--or to
himself.
Specifically, EEOC defined "direct
threat" to mean "a significant risk of
substantial harm to the health or
safety of the individual or others
that cannot be eliminated or
reduced by reasonable accommodation." This definition is broader
than the ADA language, which refers
to risks to others but not to selves.

that validly interpret Title I to
authorize an employer to screen out
individuals who, in carrying out the
essential functions of the job, would
pose a significant risk of serious
harm to their own health or safety,
Chevron argues.
A requirement that the individual
be able to perform the essential
functions of the particular job without risking serious injury or death is
obviously job related. Safety and
efficiency are legitimate employment goals. New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568
(1979).
According to Chevron, a legal duty
to hire employees whose health
would be compromised simply by
doing the job, and who may even
die as a result, would not only place
employers in a moral dilemma but
could cause serious practical harm.
Such individuals typically would not
be able to perform the job on an
ongoing and reliable basis.
Employers would then bear the
costs and disruption of filling the
gap left by sick or deceased employees, using temporary workers, overtime, or new workers who require
training.

Chevron argues that the EEOC's
direct-threat regulation is entitled to
deference because it is not at odds
with the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.

Job-related illnesses or deaths also
lower employee morale, which leads
to reduced productivity. Adverse
publicity is another risk for businesses forced to hire workers who
would be in danger on the job. A
newspaper headline reading
"Employee Dies of Chemical
Poisoning" would be highly injurious to a company's reputation
among customers and undermine
employee relations and morale.

Congress, in the ADA, commanded
the EEOC to issue regulations to
carry out the law's Title I employment provisions, Chevron says.
Exercising that express authority,
the EEOC promulgated regulations

Also of great concern to Chevron is
the risk that employing a disabled
person who will be harmed on the
job will result in state administrative, tort, or criminal actions. An
employer who violates state worker
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safety laws risks criminal sanctions,
including fines and imprisonment.
The Ninth Circuit violated the most
basic principles governing judicial
review of agency action when it
refused to defer to the EEOC's regulation on the direct-threat defense,
the company says.
By requiring employers knowingly
to endanger workers, the Ninth
Circuit's decision imposes an
unconscionable moral burden on
employers. Given the plethora of
significant adverse effects that businesses suffer as a result of workplace illness, injury, or death, the
EEOC's interpretation of the directthreat defense, which avoids placing
workers in jobs that would destroy
their health, is undoubtedly correct.
Chevron further maintains that
nothing in the ADA prohibits the
EEOC from recognizing personal
safety as a valid job-qualification
standard. In addition, congressional
committee reports on the ADA show
that Congress intended that the
safety of the employee himself
would continue to be a valid
employment consideration, as it was
under a prior disability rights law,
the Rehabilitation Act.
Chevron argues that it satisfied the
direct-threat defense in this case.
The company says its written job
requirements specified that plant
helpers must be able to withstand
exposure to hydrocarbons, solvents,
and other liver-toxic chemicals.
Chevron physicians experienced in
industrial medicine, as well as
Echazabal's own doctor, said his
liver disease would be exacerbated
by exposure to hepatotoxins and
that he could be killed by a leak.
The company says it was entitled to
rely on the reasonable conclusions
of these physicians.

Finally, Chevron argues that
Echazabal did not prove that he was
a "qualified individual" entitled to
the protection of the ADA. A "qualified individual" is defined as one
who can perform the essential functions of the job. A person who will
be made sick or be killed performing a job cannot perform that job on
a continuing basis, the company
says.
Echazabal counters that the ADA's
direct-threat defense is clear. By
specifying only threats to "other
individuals in the workplace," the
statute makes it clear that threats to
the disabled person himself are not
included within the scope of the
defense, he says.
The obvious reading of the directthreat defense as not including
threats to oneself is also supported
by the definitional section of Title I,
which states that "the term 'direct
threat' means a significant risk to
the health or safety of others that
cannot be eliminated by reasonable
accommodations," Echazabal maintains. The fact that the statute consistently defines the direct-threat
defense to include only threats to
others eliminates any possibility
that Congress committed a drafting
error when it omitted from the
defense threats to the disabled individual himself, he adds.
The ADA's legislative history also
supports the conclusion that the
direct-threat provision does not
include threats to oneself, he says.
The term "direct threat" is used
hundreds of time throughout the
ADA's legislative history-in the
final conference report, the various
committee reports and hearings,
and the floor debate. In nearly every
instance in which the term appears,
it is accompanied by a reference to
the threat to "others" or to "other
individuals in the workplace." Not
once is the term accompanied by a

reference to threats to the disabled
person himself, Echazabal argues.
He further asserts that Congress's
decision not to include threats to
one's own health or safety in the
"direct-threat" defense is consistent
with the principles that underlie the
ADA.
Echazabal maintains that the ADA
was designed in part to prohibit discrimination against individuals with
disabilities that takes the form of
paternalism. This goal is codified in
the act itself. In the "Findings" section of the ADA, Congress concluded that "overprotective rules and
policies" are one form of discrimination confronting individuals with
disabilities.
Courts have interpreted federal job
discrimination statutes, such as
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, to prohibit paternalistic
employment policies. For example,
in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321 (1991), the Supreme Court stated that "the argument that a particular job is too dangerous for women
may appropriately be met by the
rejoinder that it is the purpose of
Title VII to allow the individual
woman to make that choice for herself." Given Congress's decision in
Title VII to let individuals decide for
themselves whether to put their
own health and safety at risk,
Echazabal reasons that it should
come as no surprise that it would
enact legislation allowing the
same freedom of choice to disabled
individuals.
SIGNIFICANCE
When Congress enacted the ADA in
1990, it was responding to a climate
in which the disabled were relegated
to second-class citizen status. The
disabled often could not access the
places and services that able-bodied
individuals routinely enjoyed.
(Continued on Page 278)
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One of the primary focuses of
Congress was in the area of employment. Title I of the ADA was aimed
at requiring employers to provide
reasonable accommodations to their
disabled workers so that these individuals could fully participate in the
economic life of the nation.
Title I of the ADA prohibits an
employer from discriminating
against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of
such individual. Employers are prohibited from using standards that
disqualify a person with a disability
unless they are job related and consistent with business necessity.
The ADA permits employers to disqualify an individual from a job
when his or her disability would
pose a "direct threat" to the
health or safety of other people in
the workplace. But the EEOC,
which enforces the ADA's jobdiscrimination provisions, broadly
defines this statutory defense as
allowing employers to also disqualify
individuals whose disability poses a
direct threat to their own health or
safety.
Both employers and disabled
Americans need clarification on the
correct standard to be applied in
future employment situations.
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